Climategate, Public Opinion, and the Loss of Trust

Anthony A. LeiserowitzEdward W. Maibach, […], and EricaDawson+2View all authors and affiliations

Volume 57, Issue 6

Research Policy

https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764212458272

Boundaries, breaches, and bridges: The case of Climategate

Volume 43, Issue 1, February 2014, Pages 60-73

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.07.007Get rights and content

Abstract

We examine the incident known as “Climategate” in which emails and other documents relating to climate scientists and their work were illegitimately accessed and posted to the Internet. The contents of the files prompted questions about the credibility of climate science and the legitimacy of some of the climate scientists’ practices. Multiple investigations unfolded to repair the boundary that had been breached. While exonerating the scientists of wrongdoing and endorsing the legitimacy of the consensus opinion, the investigating committees suggested revisions to some scientific practices. Despite this boundary repair work, the credibility and legitimacy of the scientific enterprise were not fully restored in the eyes of several stakeholders. We explore why this is the case, identify boundary bridging approaches to address these issues, and highlight policy implications.

Introduction

In late November 2009, a computer server at the University of East Anglia’s (UEA) Climatic Research Unit (CRU) was hacked, and thousands of emails and other files were illegitimately obtained and then posted to the Internet via a “sophisticated and carefully orchestrated attack” (Norfolk Constabulary, 2012; see also House of Commons, 2010, p. 5–6). Dating from March 1996, the files offered a selective glimpse into the making of climate science (Revkin, 2009, Russell Report, 2010). Popularly referred to as “Climategate,” the incident was initially considered a “mischievous” hacking attempt (Johnson, 2009), deliberately timed to sabotage the upcoming United Nation’s Climate Change Conference (known as the Copenhagen Summit).

But once the contents of the files became public, concern with how they had been obtained was quickly overwhelmed by their contents. Signaling the potentially serious threat that this incident posed to the credibility of the scientists and legitimacy of climate science, numerous investigations were initiated.3 By August 2011, nine separate investigations had been completed. Each investigation exonerated the implicated climate scientists of violating scientific norms and reaffirmed the scientific consensus regarding the anthropogenic global warming hypothesis.

One might conclude that there is not much to learn from Climategate: Some files were hacked by miscreants that embarrassed a few climate scientists who were eventually exonerated. Yet, this account leaves many questions unanswered. For instance, why did this incident occur in the first place? And, why is it that the credibility of the scientists and legitimacy of climate science continued to be called into question despite numerous investigations?

In this article, we consider the events leading up to Climategate and the processes that subsequently unfolded. Our analysis identified a paradox that we build up to in this paper. Specifically, scientists engage in boundary work (Gieryn, 1983) to distinguish themselves from non-scientists.4However, they must then bridge across the chasm they have created. This is always difficult, but particularly so when the science/non-science boundary is breached, as was the case with Climategate. In this instance, selected email exchanges purporting to represent the practices of the broader climate science community were made available to diverse stakeholders, thereby raising questions about the entire climate science infrastructure and its findings.

Though numerous investigations exonerated the implicated scientists, ongoing concerns about the credibility and legitimacy of the science remained, even after the climate scientists undertook boundary repair work to address the damage that Climategate had created. These observations generate additional questions. Specifically, how might stakeholders be convinced of the integrity of science after a breach such as Climategate? Going even further, what additional forms of organization and modes of governance might be required to reduce the possibility of incidents such as Climategate in the future?

Our analysis highlights the need for boundary bridging work. In particular, we propose a narrative approach to bridging the boundary between scientists and non-scientists. At one level, such an approach implies a shift to meaning making rather than information processing. Going even further, it also implies the creation of hybrid forums (e.g., Callon and Rabeharisoa, 2003) wherein matters of concern can be brought together alongside matters of fact (Latour, 2004). Given that new matters of concern are bound to emerge even as current ones are addressed (Callon, 1998), climate science is likely to continue unfolding and remain in-the-making. In this regard, Climategate can be seen as a crucial episode in making these issues explicit and visible, and in suggesting ways they might be addressed, or even avoided.

Section snippets

Background

Prior research has demonstrated that actors belonging to one epistemic community often find it difficult to coordinate let alone understand knowledge from other communities (Galison, 1999, Knorr Cetina, 1999), owing to processes of paradigmatic closure, inversion, and normalization (Kuhn, 1970, Latour and Woolgar, 1986, Vaughan, 1996). In this regard, boundary objects are said to facilitate coordination among epistemic communities without requiring explicit consensus (Bowker and Star, 1999, 

Methods

Our analytical strategy was to follow the controversies (Callon, 1986, Latour, 2005). We did so by examining data related to Climategate from multiple sources, including national news media, such as The TimesThe GuardianThe New York Timesand The Wall Street Journal; news sources local to those implicated, such as the Eastern Daily Press and The Daily Collegian; official press statements by the organizations involved; and numerous investigation reports – altogether more than 1000 pages of

Findings

Our analysis revealed a proliferation of social groups such as core scientists and deniers driving this controversy. It also showed the vulnerability of a seemingly robust boundary infrastructure around climate science. We also examined the investigations that unfolded to understand the incident, and the boundary repair work undertaken in response to the breach. Results of these investigations and subsequent events suggest that climate science continues to be vulnerable despite these efforts.

Implications and conclusion

Lahsen (2012) invited two sets of authors (Grundmann, 2012, Maibach et al., 2012) to reflect on Climategate to explore what we can learn. Summarizing their articles, Lahsen (2012, p. 280) concluded:Whether or not one agrees with the perspectives put forth, the two articles are, in effect, examples of the scientific community scrutinizing itself, a scrutiny that can serve to improve the community and the knowledge it produces. Ultimately, both articles suggested that Climategate had negative

Acknowledgments

Each author contributed equally. We thank Michel Callon and an anonymous reviewer for engaging with our paper, Dennis Gioia and Andrew Van de Ven for commenting on an earlier draft, and Kara Gehman for editorial assistance.

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